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The onset of the US credit crisis in 2008, and its rapid globalization induced the FED to extend unprecedented
swap-lines of 30 billion dollars to four emerging markets, and the proliferation of other cross-countries
selective swap arrangements.  This paper explores the logic for these arrangements, focusing on the
degree to which financial and trade linkages, financial openness and credit risk history account for
discerning the formation of swap arrangements to EMs.  We also study the impact of the formation
of these credit lines on the exchange rate and the financial spreads of the relevant countries.  We find
that exposure of US banks to EMs is the most important selection criterion for explaining the “selected
four” swap-lines.  This result is consistent with the outlined model, where we show that in circumstances
of unanticipated deleveraging, emergency swap-lines may prevent or mitigate costly liquidation today,
allowing investment projects to reach maturity and providing positive option value to both the source
and the recipient countries.  The FED swap-lines had relatively large short-run impact on the exchange
rates of the selected EMs, but much smaller effect on the spreads (measured relative to that of other
EMs that were not the recipients of swap-lines).   Specifically, non-swap countries saw an average
depreciation of 0.15% on the day after swap announcement, but swap countries saw their exchange
rate appreciate on average, by about 4%.  Yet, all the swap countries saw their exchange rate subsequently
depreciate to a level lower than pre-swap rate, calling into question the long-run impact of the arrangements.
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Press release, 10/29/2008: 
“Today, the Federal Reserve, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Banco de Mexico, the Bank 
of Korea, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore are announcing the establishment of 
temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap-lines). These facilities, like those 
already established with other central banks, are designed to help improve liquidity 
conditions in global financial markets and to mitigate the spread of difficulties in 
obtaining U.S. dollar funding in fundamentally sound and well managed economies.  
Federal Reserve Actions 
In response to the heightened stress associated with the global financial turmoil, which 
has broadened to emerging market economies, the Federal Reserve has authorized the 
establishment of temporary liquidity swap facilities with the central banks of these four 
large and systemically important economies.  These new facilities will support the 
provision of U.S. dollar liquidity in amounts of up to $30 billion each by the Banco 
Central do Brasil, the Banco de Mexico, the Bank of Korea, and the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore. 
These reciprocal currency arrangements have been authorized through April 30, 2009. 
The FOMC previously authorized temporary reciprocal currency arrangements with ten 
other central banks:   the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, Danmarks 
Nationalbank, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the 





I.  Introduction and summary  
 
The unfolding global liquidity crisis provides ample case studies of the assertion that 
"extraordinary times call for extraordinary action."  Our case study focuses on the unprecedented 
provision by the FED of swap-lines to four emerging markets.  While the FED extended such 
swaps lines to numerous OECD countries (described above), these arrangements were extended 
(so far) to only four emerging markets.  This begs the questions what are the selection criteria 
explaining the “chosen four,” and the degree to which these selective swaps accomplished the 
goals spelled out in the FED’s press release.   
While final evaluation of the impact of these swap-lines require much more data and 
longer time horizon, our preliminary results suggests that the exposure of US banks to EMs is the 
most important selection criterion.  Adding US trade exposure, capital account openness and 
credit history of countries to the US banks exposure provides statistically accurate interpretation 
of the selected four swap-lines.  This result is consistent with the model outlined in the Appendix   2
-- in circumstances of unanticipated deleveraging, emergency swap-lines prevent or mitigate 
costly liquidation today, thereby allowing investment projects to reach maturity.  Emergency 
swap-lines may provide valuable services in circumstances where the realized liquidity shock 
turns out to be much larger than the one expected ex-ante.  The impetus for “a larger than 
anticipated” liquidity shock may come from ‘financial contagion,’ or from an adverse real shock 
reducing the expected productivity of the investment.  The first scenario is exemplified by de-
leveraging shocks due to credit crunch and ‘flight to quality,’ affecting creditors that co-financed 
investment in EMs.  The second scenario may correspond to news about the unfolding deep 
global recession, a recession that may cause further deterioration of EMs terms of trade.  The 
recent challenges facing various EMs reflect a mixture of both scenarios.  An emergency swap-
line prevents or mitigates the depth of costly liquidation today, allowing the investment project 
to reach maturity.  Swap-lines may also provide valuable positive option value – by averting 
massive liquidation today, if things improve by the end of the investment gestation period, the 
higher surplus would support higher profits and will reduce the ultimate cost of the capital flight, 
possibly enhancing the welfare of both the source and the recipient countries [i.e., the US and the 
four EMs]. 
Our analysis suggests that swap-lines had relatively large short-run impact on the 
exchange rates of the selected EMs, but much smaller effect on the spreads (measured relative to 
that of other EMs that were not the recipients of swap-lines).   Specifically, Non-swap countries 
saw an average depreciation of 0.15% on the day after swap announcement, but swap countries 
saw their exchange rate appreciate on average, by about 4%.  Yet, all the swap countries saw 
their exchange rate subsequently depreciate to a level lower than pre-swap rate, calling into 
question the long-run impact of the arrangements.  A note of caution is in order: as the selective 
swap-lines targeted countries with large US exposure, it potentially prevented even a deeper 
exchange rate deprecation of the four.  Furthermore, only with the benefit of time we would be 
able to appreciate the fuller welfare implications of these arrangements.  
   
II. Explaining the Selectivity of the Arrangements 
Out of the 27 markets classified as emerging markets in either the FTSE Global Equity index or 
the Morgan Stanley Emerging Market index or by the Economist, only four countries received 
emergency  swap-lines from the Federal Reserve. We considered four variables that may   3
determine the inclusion of an emerging market into the swap arrangements. These are US bank 
exposure to these markets, measured by the share of the individual market in the consolidated 
foreign claims of US banks in December 2007, the share of a country in total US goods imports 
and exports in 2007, the capital account openness of the country as of 2004 (Edwards, 2006 
index) and the years since independence or 1800 that the country spent in default or restructuring 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  
 
Table 1 presents the means of each of these variables for countries that received the swap-lines 
and those that did not. Countries that did not receive the swap-lines had a lower share in total US 
bank foreign claims (0.6 percent compared to 3 percent for swap recipients), and the difference 
in the two means is significant. All the swap recipient countries had the higher shares in US bank 
exposures than all the non-swap countries, with the exception of India which had a 3 percent 
share. The mean values of share in total US goods trade are also statistically significantly 
different between swap recipients and other EMs, but mean values of capital account openness 
and credit history are not.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 present results of the probit regressions that estimate the probability of inclusion 
into a swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve. Since we have a small sample of 27 EMs out 
of which only four got the swap-lines, we run probit regressions sequentially, starting with a 
single explanatory variable and then adding more variables. US bank exposure to these countries, 
measured by the share of the individual country in the consolidated foreign claims of US banks 
in December 2007 alone explains 64% of the variation in the dependent variable. A higher US 
bank exposure to a country increases its probability of getting a swap arrangement by 10.44% 
(evaluated at average values of regressors). If we interpret a predicted probability of inclusion of 
50% or more as an inclusion prediction, then this variable alone correctly predicts 2 out of 4 
swap arrangements and 22 out of 23 cases where such arrangements were not made. Each of the 
other explanatory variables individually have low predictive power – the pseudo R-squares are 
low and the coefficients of each of the variables in columns 2-4 of Table 2 are insignificant. The 
high percentage of correctly predicted observations is due to correct predictions of no-swap-
lines, which are relatively abundant in our sample. The regressions using only capital account 
openness or only sovereign default history do not predict a higher than 50% chance of getting a   4
swap-line for any country. This table suggests that US bank exposure is the most important 
variable explaining inclusion in a swap arrangement. In Table 3, we sequentially add other 
regressors to a regression with US bank exposure as an explanatory variable. In two out of the 
three cases with exactly two regressors, the coefficient of US bank exposure remains significant 
(columns 2 and 3). In the case in which it loses significance (column 1), the explanatory power 
of the regression rises – the US bank exposure and capital account openness together correctly 
predict over 92 percent of the cases (3 out of 4 swap arrangements correctly predicted and 20 out 
of 21 exclusions from swap arrangements).
1 The insignificance of the estimated coefficients may 
be due to the small sample size and non-linear relationships between explanatory variables
2. 
Adding US trade exposure to the regression with US bank exposure and capital account 
openness, does not increase the predictive power of the regression beyond 92%. By adding the 
fourth variable - the years since 1800 or independence that the country spent in sovereign default 
or restructuring (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) - we are able to predict fully the assignment of 
swap arrangements. This result is driven by the high predictive power of US bank exposure.  
  
III. Announcement Effects of the Swap Arrangements 
The Federal Reserve’s swap arrangements with the central banks of Brazil, Korea, Mexico and 
Singapore were announced on October 29, 2008. Figure 1 plots the CDS spreads of the countries 
that received swap arrangements
3 and figures 2 and 3 plot the CDS spreads of all other emerging 
markets. The black vertical line separates the pre-swap announcement period from the post swap 
announcement period. From figure 1, it is clear that the CDS spreads of the countries that 
received the swap arrangements fell when these arrangements were announced. However, it is 
also clear from the figures that on the announcement, CDS spreads of other emerging markets 
fell too. Swap-recipient countries saw on average, a 19.5% drop in their CDS spreads between 
October 29, 2009 and October 30, 2009. The average drop was lower for non-swap countries 
(15.81% for the entire sample and 16.23% after excluding Argentina and Pakistan). In neither 
                                                 
1 The number of observations in the various regressions varies due to constraints on data availability.  
2 The correlations between the explanatory variables are not high –a maximum of 0.6.  
3 See Appendix for data sources and definitions. Data on CDS spreads of Singapore’s sovereign bonds 
was not available.  
   5
case does the average change in swap countries differ significantly from that in non-swap 
countries (p-values = 0.6).  
 
Moreover, the spreads for most emerging markets had already started declining before the swap 
arrangements were announced. Table 4 presents the peak CDS rates and the dates on which these 
peaks were reached, for each of the emerging markets. In 20 out of the 25 countries, the 2008 
peak of the CDS spreads occurred before October 29, 2008. While CDS spreads remained lower 
than their pre-swap arrangement peaks in the emerging markets that received the swap-lines, in 4 
emerging markets that did not receive swap-lines, CDS spreads subsequently rose to higher than 
their 2008 peak (Hong Kong, Poland, Czech Republic and Saudi Arabia) . 
 
To further test whether the CDS spreads in Brazil, Korea and Mexico changed more than those 
in other emerging markets, we look at the pre and post announcement average CDS levels. Table 
5 presents the results of dummy variable regressions to test for difference in means
4. The sample 
period is truncated to August 6, 2008 to Jan 21 2009, in order to have the same number of days 
(84) before and after announcement.  Pre-swap, non-swap countries’ average spread equaled 
332.17 basis points but rose significantly to 630.24 basis points in the period after the swap 
announcements. In countries that received the swap arrangements, the average spread was 
215.52 basis points in the 84 days before the arrangements were announced, but rose to 338.30 
basis points in the post-swap period. The post-swap period average is higher because although 
the spreads fell after the announcement date, they remained higher than the pre-Lehman brothers 
bankruptcy era spreads. Lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15
th, 2008 and our 
84-day window begins on August 6, 2008.  In the second column of Table 5, we exclude the two 
obvious outliers, Argentina and Pakistan, and then the differences between markets that received 
the swap arrangements and those that did not are no longer significant. The pre and post swap 
                                                 
4 The regression takes the form: 
SwapDate FedSwap FedSwap SwapDate spread CDS * _ 3 2 1 0 β β β β + + + = , so that  0 β = mean 
CDS spread for non-swap countries in pre-swap period,  1 0 β β +  = mean CDS spread for non-swap 
countries in post-swap period,  2 1 0 β β β + + = mean CDS spread for swap-recipients in the pre-swap 
period and  3 2 1 0 β β β β + + + = mean CDS spread for swap recipients in the post-swap period.   6
averages of non-swap countries are significantly different from each other but not significantly 
different from swap country averages.   
 
While the announcement effects in the CDS spreads of emerging markets are not strong, the 
same is not true for their exchange rates. Table 6 presents the results from dummy variable 
regressions on the change in exchange rates on the day before the swap-line announcements and 
the day after. Non-swap countries saw an average depreciation of 0.15% on the day after swap 
announcement, but swap countries saw their exchange rate appreciate on average, by about 4%. 
The two changes are statistically significantly different from each other, and the non-swap 
countries' depreciation is not significantly different from 0. Between the day before the 
announcement and the day of the announcement, the average exchange rate depreciation for 
non-swap countries was 1.1% and the average depreciation for swap countries at 1.7% was not 
significantly different. Moreover, all the swap countries saw their exchange rate subsequently 
depreciate to a level lower than pre-swap rate (Table 7), calling into question the long-run 
impact of the arrangements.  
 
Explaining CDS Spreads 
We model the CDS spreads of a country as a function of its country risk rating (from EIU), its 
reserves-GDP ratio and three global variables that represent the level of liquidity in the world 
economy. These include the yield on 5-year US treasuries, the Center for Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) VIX index of stock market volatility and the price-earnings ratio on S&P 100 
index. Tables 8 and 9 report the results of unit root and co-integration tests on a balanced panel 
of 19 countries and 37 months (October 2004 to October 2007). We did three panel unit root 
tests –Levin-Lin –Chu test, Sarno and Taylor (1998)’s multivariate ADF tests and Hadri (2000) 
panel unit root tests. There is evidence of unit root in all the variable series in at least one time 
series in the panel. The ADF test is unable to reject the null of a unit root for the three global 
series. The Nyblom Harvery  test for no common trends in the CDS spreads series rejects the 
null, indicating that there may be co-integrating relationships.  
 
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 presents the 
regressions with the full sample of countries, whereas Table 11 presents results with the balanced   7
panel. The risk rating is included contemporaneously in some specifications and with a lead in 
others, to account for the fact that risk ratings are often backward looking. In all the 
specifications, reserves/GDP ratio enter with a negative sign, indicating that reserves 
accumulation lowers the CDS spreads of countries.  This is consistent with our model in the 
appendix where the additional reserves may allow a country to avoid costly liquidation and 
therefore lower the cost of the probability of default. In Table 10, the full sample regressions 
without time effects, every additional percentage point increase in reserves-GDP ratio reduces 
the CDS spread by 0.64 basis points on average. In the balanced panel (Table 11), the effect of 
additional reserves is smaller, but still significant (Columns 3 and 4 with robust standard errors). 
Higher risk rating of the country and greater expected volatility in global markets also implies 
higher spreads.  
 
IV. Concluding remarks  
  This paper studied the unprecedented provision of swaps lines by the FED to four 
emerging markets.  The evidence suggests selectivity criteria where EMs with large US banks 
exposure, sizable US trade exposure, capital account openness and solid credit history are prime 
targets of swap-lines.  These results are in line with the view that it’s in the self interest of source 
countries to engage in bilateral credit arrangements with EMs as long as they have had a strong 
track-record in good times.  Countries with lukewarm economic track-record in good times 
would find that the International Financial Institutions may be the main possible sources of help 
in bad times.  This is also consistent with the recent willingness of key OECD countries to 
expand rapidly the size and the role of the IMF, and with the lukewarm attitude of Germany and 
other countries in the core of Europe towards the provision of deep swaps-lines to Eastern 
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Appendix 
International reserves and emergency swap-lines 
This Appendix outlines a framework explaining the rationale for swap-line arrangements.   
The model is extension of the one used in Aizenman and Lee (2007), explaining self insurance 
offered by international reserves in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks affecting 
banks in developing countries.  The framework is akin to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) -- 
investment in a long term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity 
shocks.  Hence, the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of the earlier investment, 
reducing second period output.  International reserves provide valuable self insurance in 
circumstances when foreign financial inflows deposited in domestic banks of a developing 
country are intermediated into longer term investment.  The maturity mismatch exposes the 
banking system to the possibility that capital flight would induce costly premature liquidation.  
This appendix shows that emergency swap-lines may enhance the expected utility of the source 
and the recipient countries following an unanticipated large deleveraging shock. 
As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial intermediation is 
done by banks, relying on a debt contract.  We simplify further by assuming that there is no 
separation between the bank and the entrepreneur – the entrepreneur is the bank owner, using it 
to finance the investment.  The time line is summarized in the figure below.   
At the beginning of period 1, risk neutral agents deposit D in banks, which in turn use D 
to finance long term investment,  1 K , and hoarding reserves, R.
5  We assume that a sizable share 
of depositors was funded by foreign parties seeking to diversify their portfolio by means of 
foreign financial investment.  A liquidity shock, with the aggregate value of Z for the borrowing 
economy, materializes at the end of period 1, after the commitment of capital. A liquidity shock 
exceeding reserves induces a pre-mature liquidation of Z - R.  Output increases with the capital 
invested at the beginning of period one, 1 K , and declines with liquidation at a rate that depends 
                                                 
5 Our model follows the tradition of Bryant (1980) or Diamond and Dybvig (1993) in that the source of 
liquidity shock lies with the lender, rather than the borrower (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). However, our 
model assumes away the market equilibrium among lenders (be it the risk of runs or the difficulty of the 
decentralized provision of liquidity). Abstracting from the question whether market-based liquidity 
insurance is available, we focus on the implication of large adjustment cost—including but not restricted 
to the liquidation cost—on the demand for reserves as self-insurance. In a similar vein, no distinction is 
made between the private sector and the monetary authorities which maintain the stock of international 
reserves.    9
on the adjustment cost, θ.  The liquidity shock is realized from a known distribution.  The new 
aspect of our Appendix is that, after the realization of the liquidity shock, we add the possibility 
of ‘black-swan’ news – an unanticipated adverse shock (with probability p, the future output will 
decline at a rate of δ).
6  Such a shock may reflect rapid deterioration of the global economy, 
reducing the expected future demand for the project. 
 
Figure A1: The time line 
 
        
     












                                                 
6 The “Black-swan" concept was coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb -- an unlikely but not impossible 
catastrophe that no one seems to plan for. 
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Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the second period output in the absence 
of “black-swan” news is  
 (A1)  { }
α θ ] 0 , ) 1 ( [ 1 2 R Z MAX K Y − + − = ;   where   1 0 < ≤θ , and  1 < α .   
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It is convenient to normalize the liquidity shock by the level of deposits, denoting the normalized 
shock by z: 
 
(A3)  zD Z = ;   1 0 ≤ < ≤ τ z , and density ) (z f  . 
 
Depositors are entitled to a real return of D r on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of 
investment.
7  Assuming agents’ subjective discount rate isρ , competitive intermediation implies 
that  
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Net reserves held until period 2 are assumed to yield a return of  f r .  We denote the 
marginal liquidity shock associated with liquidation by  D R z z / ,
* * = .   The FOC determining 
the optimal demand for international reserves can be reduced to [see Aizenman and Lee (2007)]: 
 
(A5)  [ ] R Z MP E R Z r MP K f K > = < ⋅ + − | ] Pr[ )] 1 ( [
1 θ ,  
 
                                                 
7 The possibility that the outcome of investment is not large enough to meet the promised rate of return is 
discussed in Aizenman and Lee (2007).  To simplify, we ignore it in the present set up.   11
where 
1 K MP is the marginal productivity of capital, and  ] Pr[ R Z <  is the probability that the 
liquidity shock is below the level of reserves. The expected opportunity cost of holding reserves 
is equalized to the expected precautionary benefit of holding reserves.  
To illustrate, we consider the case with small shocks to gain the basic insight for the 
welfare gains associated with reserves. In the absence of uncertainty, the optimal level of 
deposits (
*
0 D ), and the resultant surplus ( ) 0 Π are: 
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Suppose that the liquidity shocks are either zero or 0 z , with probability half each, and  f r = ρ .  If 
reserves are set to zero, and deposits at
*
0 D , the expected surplus is  
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The first order approximation of the expected surplus can be reduced to 
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Liquidity shocks have a first order adverse effect on expected surplus.  In the absence of the 
insurance provided by reserves, liquidation induces a deadweight loss equal to the adjustment 
cost, θ, times the expected liquidation.  In a two states of nature case, perfect stabilization can be 
achieved by hoarding reserves equal to the liquidity shock: 
*
0 0D z R = ; adjusting deposits to 
*
0 0) 1 ( D z D + = , thereby setting the stock of capital at 
*
0 1 D K = .  If the liquidity shock 
materializes, R would provide the needed liquidity, preventing costly output adjust.  If the shock   12
is nil, there would no need to use R.  The assumption that f r = ρ implies that the cost of this 
insurance is zero.  Consequently, 
8  
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This simple example suggests that liquidity shocks have a first order welfare effects in 
the absence of reserves, and that hoarding reserves can reduce the cost of liquidity shocks from 
first to second order magnitude.   
 
Black-swan news and emergency swap-lines 
  We apply the above model to understand the provisions of emergency swap-lines.  To 
simplify, we focus first on the last example, assuming that  0 z is zero, hence the optimal demand 
for international reserves is zero, and the level of borrowing is given by (A6), 














= D .  
Suppose that at the end of period 1, after the commitment of capital, an exogenous and 
unanticipated “black-swan” shock reduces the expected productivity of investment.  Specially, 
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where 0 , 1 p δ ≤≤ .  Thus, the expected future output drops to   
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8 With more than two states of nature, R would be preset at the ex-ante efficient level, providing full 
insurance for liquidity shocks below z*, and partial insurance above.  While there is no way to insure 
complete stabilization, one expects large welfare gain from setting R at the ex-ante efficient level relative 
to the case of R = 0. 
   13
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Applying (A6) and (A11), the expected output falls short of the second period liabilities iff  
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If (A11’) holds, depositors expecting that the first to be “in line” will get higher share of their 
deposit back will “run on the bank.”  The premature liquidation implies that each depositor will 
get only 1 θ −  pre dollar deposited.  In these circumstances, the run on the bank would impact the 
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Suppose that the depositors’ source country, in order to prevent the bank-run in the emerging 
market, would extend a swap-line of 
*
0 D , at a contractual cost of 1 ρ + .  In these circumstances, 
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Applying (A6) and (A14), the swap-lines is beneficial iff 
 
 
                                                 
9 We assume that in case of partial default, the realized output is fully paid to depositors.    14
 (A15) 





It is easy to verify that, conditional of the black-swan news, the recipient country is better off -- 
its surplus following the black-swan news and the bank-run would be zero.  Yet, its the expected 
surplus with the swap-line is 
*
0 (1 )(1 ) 0 pD α −− > .  Consequently, the emergency swap-line is a 
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Figure (A2), area SL traces configurations of the adverse output shock (δ) and costly liquidation 
(θ) where the swap-lines would increase the expected welfare, for three (α, p) pairs.  This is the 
area above the upward sloping line and to the left of the vertical line [tracing  ( 1)/ p α δα θ +− = 
and 1 p δ α −= , respectively].   
                   
Figure A2 
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To conclude, the swap-line provided by the source country bails out its depositors, sparing them 
the penalty associated with the liquidation costs.  The swap-lines provide the creditors’ source 
country with the option value that, if the adverse shock would not materialize, the source country 
would be fully paid.  If the adverse shock would take place, the source country would be 
paid
*
0 (1 )[ ] D
α
δ − .  In both cases, the swap-line saved the source country the liquidation costs. If 
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   15
liquidation costs (θ) are high enough, and if the size of the coming “black-swan” shock (δ) is 
high enough, large exposure implies that these swap arrangements are a win-win to both the 
source and the recipient countries.  Our analysis can be extended in several ways, adding the 
possibility of ‘self insurance’ provided by international reserves, costly bankruptcies, and other 
relevant dimensions.     16
 
 
Table A1. Data Definitions 
Variable Name  Source  Description  
USBankExpShare07 BIS  Quarterly 
Review, Dec 
2008, Table 9B  
Consolidated claims of US banks on individual 
countries divided by the consolidated claims of US 
banks on all countries in December 2007. 
USTradeShare2007  UN Comtrade  Total US goods trade with the individual country as a 
share of US goods trade with the world in 2007.  
Edwards2004  Edwards (2005)  Edwards index of de-jure capital account openness of 
the country in the year 2004. 
CDS5yr  Datastream  Credit default swap spread on sovereign senior 5-
year bond. 
RiskEIU Datastream  Economist  Intelligence Unit’s country risk rating 
VIX  Datastream  CBOE’s Volatility Index 
SP100_PE Datastream  Price-Earnings ratio of S&P 100 index. 
Reserves/GDP  IFS  Ratio of total reserves minus to GDP. This variable 
has monthly granularity. The quarterly GDP series 
available from IFS were converted into monthly 
series using linear interpolation.  
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Non-Swap Recipients  0.007  56.25  0.012  17.98 
Swap Recipients  0.034  65.63  0.042  17.5 




Table 2: Univariate Probit Regressions for explaining inclusion in Fed Swap Arrangements 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
USBankExpShare2007 116.9**      
 (50.73)       
KOpen2004   0.024     
   (0.020)     
years_default_c1800     -0.001   
     (0.0195)   
ustrd_share2007       13.27 
       (8.393) 
Constant -2.962***  -2.455*  -0.920**  -1.297*** 
  (1.06) (1.28)  (0.46) (0.38) 
Observations  27 26  23 25 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.64 0.06  0.00 0.11 
Percent Correctly Explained  89  85  83  84 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 3: Multivariate Probit Regressions for explaining inclusion in Fed Swap Arrangements 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
 
USBankExpShare2007 160.1  114.8**  116.2**  154.5  3969 
 (108.2)  (51.85)  (47.40)  (106.3)  (0) 
KOpen2004 0.039      0.037  1.567 
 (0.034)      (0.035)  (324.5) 
years_default_c1800   -0.003      2.034 
   (0.041)      (1615) 
ustrd_share2007     -6.159  -2.671  322.4 
     (19.33)  (26.07)  (0) 
Constant -6.185  -2.874**  -2.758***  -5.896  -214.9 
 (4.108)  (1.234)  (0.992)  (4.296)  (30314) 
Observations  26  23 25  25 21 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.72  0.61 0.64  0.72 1.00 
Percent Explained Correctly  92  87  88  92  100 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Peak CDS Spreads in full sample and 2008. 
 
Country PeakCDS_2008  PeakCDS_2008_Date PeakCDS  PeakCDS_Date 
Argentina 4570.398 30-Dec-08  4570.398  30-Dec-08 
Brazil 600.8  23-Oct-08  900.2  31-May-04 
Chile 315  24-Oct-08  315  24-Oct-08 
China 296.7  24-Oct-08  296.7  24-Oct-08 
Colombia 613.3 24-Oct-08  655.9  12-Apr-04 
CzechRepublic 228.3  27-Oct-08  230  21-Jan-09 
Egypt 767.8  29-Oct-08  767.8  29-Oct-08 
HongKong 108.6  31-Oct-08 118.6  21-Jan-09 
Hungary 605  24-Oct-08  605  24-Oct-08 
India 215.7  12-Feb-08  215.7  12-Feb-08 
Indonesia 1256.7 23-Oct-08  1256.7  23-Oct-08 
Israel 275  24-Oct-08  275  24-Oct-08 
Korea 700  27-Oct-08  700  27-Oct-08 
Malaysia 520.2 24-Oct-08  520.2  24-Oct-08 
Mexico 606.7  23-Oct-08  606.7  23-Oct-08 
Morocco 350 3-Nov-08  518.407  27-Jun-03 
Pakistan 5105.699  27-Oct-08  5105.699  27-Oct-08 
Peru 611.2  24-Oct-08  611.2  24-Oct-08 
Philippines 870  24-Oct-08 870  24-Oct-08 
Poland 288.1  17-Dec-08  290.8  21-Jan-09 
Russia 1116.7  24-Oct-08  1116.7  24-Oct-08 
SaudiArabia 245  8-Dec-08  265  21-Jan-09 
South Africa  683.3  24-Oct-08  683.3  24-Oct-08 
Thailand 524.2  24-Oct-08  524.2  24-Oct-08 
Turkey 849.2  24-Oct-08  849.2  24-Oct-08 
Note: Full sample is the period 1 Jan 2003 to 21 Jan 2009 for most countries. India and Saudi 
Arabia’s data starts in early 2008. 
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Table 5: Announcement effects on CDS Spreads 
Variables (1)  (2) 
   No  Outliers
Swap_Date 298.1***  127.1*** 
 (27.50)  (6.854) 
Fed_swap -116.6**  2.277 
 (55.55)  (13.27) 
Fed_swap*Swap_Date -175.3**  -4.350 
 (78.94)  (18.87) 
Constant 332.2***  213.2*** 
 (19.24)  (4.793) 
Observations 2993  2751 
R-squared 0.047  0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses. (2) excludes Argentina and 












Table 6: Announcement effects on Exchange Rates (X) 
    No  Outliers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  ΔX _post-swap  ΔX _pre-swap  ΔX _post-swap ΔX _pre-swap 
      
Fed_swap -4.147*** -0.639 -4.155*** -0.532 
  (1.003) (0.937) (1.052) (0.965) 
Constant  0.153 -1.059*** 0.161 -1.167*** 
  (0.386) (0.361) (0.421) (0.386) 
Observations  27 27 25 25 
R-squared  0.406 0.018 0.404 0.013 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   21
 
Table 7: Exchange rate bottoms in 2008 and since 2006. 
 
Country X_maxdate08 X_maxdate ΔX _post-swap 
Argentina 8-Dec-08 29-Jan-09 -0.22 
Chile 21-Nov-08 21-Nov-08 0.81 
China 1-Jan-08 18-Jan-06 -0.04 
Colombia 28-Oct-08 28-Jun-06 0.75 
Czech 20-Nov-08 2-Jan-06 2.58 
Egypt 26-Oct-08 20-May-06 -0.13 
HongKong 12-Jun-08 3-Aug-07 0.00 
Hungary 24-Oct-08 29-Jan-09 1.70 
India 20-Nov-08 20-Nov-08 -0.34 
Indonesia 25-Nov-08 25-Nov-08 -0.47 
Israel 20-Nov-08 22-Feb-06 -1.11 
Malaysia 4-Dec-08 2-Jan-06 -1.37 
Morocco 14-Nov-08 29-Jan-09 -0.91 
Pakistan 17-Oct-08 17-Oct-08 0.37 
Peru 26-Dec-08 13-Jan-06 0.00 
Philippines 18-Nov-08 29-Jun-06 -0.51 
Poland 20-Nov-08 29-Jan-09 1.88 
Russia 31-Dec-08 29-Jan-09 0.04 
SaudiArabia 16-Oct-08 16-Oct-08 0.01 
SouthAfrica 22-Oct-08 22-Oct-08 0.97 
Taiwan 27-Oct-08 20-Jan-09 -1.33 
Thailand 1-Dec-08 2-Jan-06 0.06 
Turkey 19-Nov-08 19-Nov-08 0.80 
Brazil 8-Dec-08 8-Dec-08 -1.12 
Korea 24-Nov-08 24-Nov-08 -10.85 
Mexico 20-Nov-08 27-Jan-09 -2.64 
Singapore 1-Dec-08 2-Jan-06 -1.37 
Note: X_maxdate08 = date at which the exchange rate was most depreciated 
during 2008, X_maxdate = date at which the exchange rate wasat its lowest 
level (most depreciated level) 1 Jan 2006 and 19 Jan 2009. ΔX _postswap is 
the change in exchange rate between October 29 and October 30, 2008.   22
Table 8: Panel Unit Root Tests 
Levin-Lin-Chu Tests.  
H0: All time series in the panel are I(1) 
   t(star)  p-value   
CDS Spreads    2.63  0.996   
RiskEIU   1.18  0.88   
Reserves/GDP   0.25  0.6   
        
Multivariate ADF (Sarno and Taylor, 1998).  
H0: All time series in the panel are I(1) 
   MADF  5%  Critical  Value 
CDS Spreads    170.16  25.46   
RiskEIU   134.18  25.46   
Reserves/GDP   143.43  25.46   
        
Hadri (2000) Panel Unit Root Test.  
H0: All time series in the panel are I(0). 
 Z(mu)  p-value  Z(tau)  p-value 
CDS Spreads  65.67  0  28.13  0 
RiskEIU 81.19  0  25.87  0 
Reserves/GDP 56.38  0  20.83  0 
        
ADF Tests for Unit roots in Global Series   
H0: The series has a unit root.     
   Z(t)  p-value   
US Treasury5y    -1.486  0.54   
VIX   0.291  0.98   
S&P100_PE   -0.836  0.81   
Note: All regression equations allow for a trend and a constant. The markets in the 
balanced panel are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, HongKong, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, SouthAfrica, Thailand and Turkey.  
 
Table 9: Nyblom Harvey Test for Common Trends in the 19 time series of CDS 
Spreads 
H0: No common trends among the 19 series in the panel.      
Test Statistic assuming IID RW errors    5.8 
Test Statistic with non-parametric adjustment for long-run variance    2.55 
Critical Values   N=20  N=10 
10% 4.18 2.28 
5% 4.5 2.53 
1% 5.11 3.14 
   23
Table 10: CDS Spreads in EMEs, 2003-Sept2008 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  cds5yr cds5yr cds5yr cds5yr 
      
RiskEIU 2.493***    2.493*   
  (0.829)  (1.410)  
UStreasury5y -27.34***  -27.19*** -27.34*** -27.19*** 
  (5.591) (5.600) (5.585) (5.619) 
VIX  1.922** 1.914** 1.922** 1.914** 
  (0.808) (0.806) (0.769) (0.776) 
SP100_PE  6.734*** 6.641*** 6.734*** 6.641*** 
  (1.156) (1.158) (1.828) (1.825) 
Reserves/GDP -63.15***  -64.03*** -63.15*** -64.03*** 
  (23.29) (23.24) (16.05) (15.84) 
F.RiskEIU   2.621***   2.621* 
   (0.828)  (1.423) 
Constant  15.57 12.53 15.57 12.53 
  (63.91) (63.41) (90.96) (90.86) 
Observations  1032 1032 1032 1032 
R-squared  0.180 0.181 0.180 0.181 
Number  of  countries  21 21 21 21 
Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects estimators, no time dummies. Columns 3 and 4 
use robust standard errors. Monthly data, with end of the month CDS spreads. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 11: CDS Spreads in EMEs, Balanced Panel, Oct2004- Oct2007 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  cds5yr cds5yr cds5yr cds5yr 
      
RiskEIU  3.512***  3.512***  
  (0.733)  (1.242)  
UStreasury5y -13.04*  -14.86**  -13.04  -14.86* 
  (6.903) (6.982) (7.989) (8.168) 
VIX  3.298*** 3.318*** 3.298*** 3.318*** 
  (0.850) (0.856) (0.774) (0.801) 
SP100_PE  15.29*** 14.14*** 15.29*** 14.14*** 
  (2.906) (2.958) (2.952) (3.042) 
Reserves/GDP -36.56  -34.63  -36.56**  -34.63** 
  (25.23) (25.78) (17.07) (17.22) 
F.RiskEIU   3.623***  3.623*** 
   (0.753)  (1.252) 
Constant  -284.5*** -261.0*** -284.5*** -261.0*** 
  (88.47) (89.08) (91.59) (92.14) 
Observations  703 684 703 684 
R-squared  0.207 0.211 0.207 0.211 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 
Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects estimators, no time dummies. Columns 3 and 4 
use robust standard errors. Monthly data, with end of the month CDS spreads. For list of 
markets in balanced panel, see notes to Table 7. 


























Figure 1: Spreads on Credit default swaps of 5-year senior sovereign debt of countries that 
received swap-lines from the Federal Reserve in October 2008.  




































Figure 2.a. Spreads on Credit Default Swaps on 5-year senior sovereign debt of other emerging 





































Figure 2.b. Spreads on Credit Default Swaps on 5-year senior sovereign debt of other emerging 
markets.  
 
 